Eventually, of course, Moscow accepted NATO’s decision in 1997 to take in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary; it had no other choice. But the Russian flip-flops are worth recalling at a time when Vladimir Putin, Yeltsin’s successor, is sparking jubilation with his pro-Western tilt in the showdown over terrorism. According to Secretary of State Colin Powell, U.S.-Russian relations are undergoing “a seismic sea change of historic proportions.” On a visit to Brussels last week, Putin sent NATO officials into near ecstasy by apparently dropping his opposition to the next stage of expansion, which will almost certainly include the Baltic states–extending NATO into the territory of the former Soviet Union.
But before we proclaim the dawn of a new era, it’s worth pondering two questions. First, how seriously should Washington be taking Putin’s foreign-policy rethink in the aftermath of Sept. 11? Second, how far should the Bush team go in embracing a Kremlin regime that, until recently, evoked skepticism and uneasiness?
After his first meeting with Putin, in June, Bush said: “I looked the man in the eye and found him very trustworthy.” Many commentators ridiculed the seeming naivete of that remark, but it appears to be paying dividends now. Bush advisers argued that they needed to make Putin and Russia feel important and respected, even if the Americans weren’t offering any major policy concessions–especially because they weren’t. In doing so, the president may be taking a page out of his father’s playbook. Bush senior deftly handled Mikhail Gorbachev after the Berlin wall came down. He praised and stroked the Soviet leader, while maneuvering to achieve German unification on purely Western terms. The result: a united Germany firmly in NATO, with all Soviet troops withdrawn from East Germany. So the answer to the first question may be to take Putin’s change of heart at face value, at least for public consumption, while working steadily to nail down those gains that cannot be easily reversed.
Beyond cooperation in the fight against terrorism, this should include a renewed commitment to NATO expansion. Russia’s protests have always been overblown, particularly by Western pundits prone to panic at any hint of Kremlin disapproval. The plain fact is that NATO doesn’t threaten Russia, and nothing is more ludicrous than the notion that the addition of the tiny Baltic states will do so. A bigger NATO has meant a more stable region, and Russia is coming to appreciate the benefits of stability on at least some of its borders. It is increasingly preoccupied with the turbulent Islamic south and, longer term, with China. Putin now appears to feel that the benefits of closer relations with the West outweigh the drawbacks.
All of which leads to the second question, about how far Washington and its allies should go in reciprocating the sentiment. Russia has its own agenda and is getting a sympathetic hearing. This includes Moscow’s bid to join the World Trade Organization and closer consultations on security issues. The EU already agreed last week to let the Russians monitor plans for Europe’s planned Rapid Reaction Force. On Chechnya, Putin has won German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder’s support for “a more differentiated evaluation in world opinion.” Translation: the West won’t protest much about the Kremlin’s continuing campaign against what it calls terrorist rebels.
If the organizing principle of the new world order is the fight against terrorism, much of this makes sense. But just as during the cold war, the West can pay the price for embracing new allies with too much enthusiasm–in this case, Russia. Russia’s brutal campaign in Chechnya has arguably fueled the growth of radical Islamic movements rather than contained them. While Washington has welcomed Iran’s support for the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, Russia took advantage of the sudden change in atmosphere to sign a $300 million deal to export military and nuclear technology to Tehran. If the Bush administration was upset by that prospect before Sept. 11, there’s still good reason to be wary now. (Iran, Washington believes, remains a prime backer of Islamic extremists.) Then, too, Putin’s domestic policies are troubling at best, particularly the crackdown earlier this year on media outlets critical of him.
So, yes, Washington and its allies should continue to stroke the Russians and welcome the change of tone in the relationship. But no one should take anything for granted, even after an eels-and-vodka dinner.
